9 July 2026, Beechcraft 95-B55 Baron, N202DK, Waterloo, Illinois [Fatal]

On July 9, 2026, at about 2248 local time, a Beechcraft 95-B55 Baron, N202DK, registered to Auto Key Masters and Locksmith LLC out of Watts, Oklahoma, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Waterloo, Illinois. The two non-instrument rated private pilots were fatally injured. The personal flight originated from St. Louis Regional Airport (ALN/KALN), St. Louis, Illinois, at 2226, and was destined to Smith Field Airport (SLG/KSLG), Siloam Springs, Arkansas.

[Photo: aircraftcom sale listing]

According to preliminary flight-tracking history, on July 9, at 1438, the airplane departed Sallisaw Municipal Airport (JSV/KJSV), Sallisaw, Oklahoma, on a flight to SLG. The airplane landed at 1500, and departed at 1644 on a flight to ALN. The airplane landed in Saint Louis at 1827. The purpose of the flight was to watch a St. Louis Cardinals game.

According to Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data, the airplane departed runway 11 at St. Louis and proceeded to enter a climbing right hand turn to an altitude of 5,100 ft. At 2245, the airplane started a descent from that altitude. At 2246, the airplane entered a right hand turn with a reported descent rate of 1400 feet per minute (fpm). At 2246:38, the airplane stopped the turn and was now flying at 4,400 ft. At 2247:39, the airplane entered a left hand turn to the south. At 2247:53, the airplane was seen on a 2500 fpm descent. The airplane descended to about 4,000 ft before it began a very steep climb with a reported rate of 7360 fpm. At 2248:15, the airplane reached the crest of that climb at 5,100 ft before it began another rapid descent that continued until the end of the track. At one point, the reported descent rate was 11260 fpm. The last ADS-B data point was recorded at 2248:40, the airplane was at 2,000 ft, 157 knots groundspeed, and 3000 fpm descent rate.

Figure 1: Entire Track (ADS-B exchange data ran through Flysto)

Figure 2: End of track, note rapid climb followed by spiral descent.

The pilot, aged 48, held a private pilot certificate with an airplane single engine land and multi engine land ratings. His third class FAA medical was issued on 9/2024. The pilot did not hold an instrument rating.

The pilot’s son, aged 22, held a private pilot certificate with an airplane single engine land rating. His third class FAA medical was issued on 9/2024. The pilot did not hold an instrument rating.

The accident airplane, serial number TC-2152, was manufactured in 1978. It was a six-seat twin-engine monoplane with a retractable tricycle landing gear configuration. The airplane was powered by two 260 HP Continental IO-470L reciprocating engines, each engine drove a three-bladed McCauley propeller.

According to a sale listing for the accident aircraft, it was equipped with a Garmin GNS430W GPS and Century IV autopilot.

According to weather imagery from the time of the accident, severe conditions were present in the region and directly in the airplane’s flight track. A convective SIGMET was active at the time for the region. Two nearby airports were reporting possible thunderstorms as well.

Figure 3: Flightaware track with weather overlay

According to the National Weather Service (NWS) Area Forecast Discussion for St Louis Missouri, issued at 0621 PM CDT (1821 LT) Thu Jul 9 2026:

“The main concern will be scattered showers and thunderstorms developing at various times through the upcoming period. However, confidence in these affecting any one TAF site is fairly low. This evening`s thunderstorms are likely to occur south of the St Louis metro, but may impact parts of central Missouri with JEF the most likely to be impacted. Otherwise we expect primarily mid level cloud decks well within the VFR range. Additional thunderstorms are possible tomorrow afternoon area wide, but confidence remains low on where or when.”

According to the NTSB Safety Alert SA-023, “Pilots: Manage Risks to Ensure Safety: Good decision-making and risk management practices can help prevent accidents:”

The Problem:

Although few pilots knowingly accept severe risks, accidents can also result when several risks of marginal severity are not identified or are ineffectively managed by the pilot and compound into a dangerous situation. Accidents also result when the pilot does not accurately perceive situations that involve high levels of risk.

Ineffective risk management or poor aeronautical decision-making can be associated with almost any type of fatal accident across all general aviation (GA) sectors.

What can pilots do?

  • Develop good decision-making practices that will allow you to identify personal attitudes that are hazardous to safe flying, apply behavior modification techniques, recognize and cope with stress, and effectively use all resources. Understand the safety hazards associated with human fatigue and strive to eliminate fatigue contributors in your life.

  • Understand that effective risk management takes practice. It is a decision-making process by which you can systematically identify hazards, assess the degree of risk, and determine the best course of action.

  • Be honest with yourself and your passengers about your skill level and proficiency. Refuse to allow external pressures, such as the desire to save time or money or the fear of disappointing passengers, to influence you to attempt or continue a flight in conditions in which you are not comfortable.

  • Be honest with yourself and the FAA about your medical condition. If you have a medical condition or are taking any medication, do not fly until your fitness for flight has been thoroughly evaluated.

Cross country. At night. No instrument rating. Convective SIGMET along route. Such an easily avoidable tragedy.

Hoover I’m terribly sorry, but I’ve accidentally flagged your post and now I can’t undo it.

1 Like

I think the important thing here is all of the training that comes alongside basic attitude instrument flying. I get the feeling that people think that an instrument rating is all about flying when you can’t see out the window. While that is an important part of it, so is risk management. Things like proper weather briefings, hazardous weather and how to properly steer clear, the associated ADM, how to use the tools you have (FIS-B, radar, etc) and importantly their limitations…

Here the pilots clearly flew straight in to a monster’s mouth. We can never know their thought process, what they saw or didn’t see or what tools they had, but this was completely and quite easily avoidable.

Condolences to the loved ones.

I can’t understand how someone with a multi engine rating and presumably their own twin engined plane, doesn’t get an instrument rating. If you can afford the plane shown in the picture, clearly money is not the problem. Even if you don’t want to fly in instrument conditions, it’s got to be generally helpful in boosting overall skill.